

The following comments pertain to the new Rule 26, Ranked Voting Method.

The comments address elements of the rules typically in the order the rules are listed. My comments are numbered uniquely across all rules. My comments cover issues in a range of severity, from minor word smithing to opportunities for substantive improvements to the intent of the rules, to identifying serious mistakes in the rules as written. I have generally tried to offer specific alternatives for improving or correcting the rules in their next version.

1. In Rule 26.1.2, the definition of "Duplicate ranking", the use of "any" is potentially ambiguous. The phrase "on a single ballot" should be avoided or used consistently. See also for example Rule 26.1.3, the definition of "Overvote". A different wording could clearly make that phrase unnecessary, unless it is possible that the same candidate can be a candidate in multiple ranked voting contests in the same election, in which case the qualifying phrase should be "in a single contest".

Recommend: Change the definition to more closely parallel the wording of Rule 26.1.3 and to read:

"Duplicate Ranking" means a voter marked more than one ranking for the same candidate.

Alternatively, for maximum simplicity of the rules, omit both the definition of "Duplicate ranking" and Rule 26.8.3, since that rule only makes explicit what the other rules otherwise effect.

2. In Rule 26.1.4, "Rank" is defined as a noun. However "Ranking" is not defined, but is used extensively in the definitions and other rules. "Rank" is instead often used as a verb. Also, it would be helpful to explicitly connect the highest ranking as designating the voter's most preferred candidate.

Recommend: Use the definition of "Rank" to instead define "Ranking". Define "Rank" as a related verb and use the two terms consistently according to their definitions. Change the last sentence to read:

Ranking number one is the highest ranking for the voter's most preferred candidate, ranking number two is the next-highest ranking for the voter's second-most preferred candidate, and so on.

3. In Rule 26.1.5, the definition of "Skipped ranking", uses the term "rank" as a verb which appears to make the definition apply to the process of the voter marking a ballot rather than the result of such ballot marking. The term "in numerical order" is ambiguous and strictly speaking does not describe what is intended. For example, the numbers 6, 2, 4 are not listed in numerical order but the numbers 3, 5, 7 are listed in numerical order, they just are not consecutive integers. The definition does not cover the case, except possibly by ambiguous

description of an example, of not assigning any candidate a number one ranking while assigning a candidate a number two ranking. The example is inconclusive in that it does not explicitly mention the key feature that the voter does not rank any candidate with a "2". The phrase "or leaves a ranking blank" does offer much clarification and creates more possible questions than it might answer. The definition does not cover whether a ranking for an unqualified write-in candidate should be treated as a skipped ranking and hence cause, per Rule 26.8.2, lower rankings to be ignored.

Recommend: Change the definition of "Skipped ranking" to read:

"Skipped Ranking" means a ranking that the voter did not use even though the voter used a lower ranking. A ranking for an unqualified write-in candidate is not a skipped ranking, but is ignored.

Optionally, the following example could also be given:

For example, if a voter only ranks one candidate with a 1 and another candidate with a 3, the ranking 2 is a skipped ranking because it is not used but the lower 3 ranking is used.

Alternatively, for maximum simplicity of the rules, omit the definition of "Skipped ranking" and Rule 26.8.2. This makes the the rules more permissive in what they accept and ignoring skipped rankings is the effect of the remaining rules.

4. Rule 26.1.6, the definition of "Surplus votes" employs a confusing nonsequitor, "the votes cast for a winning candidate". It is confusing because the ranked voting methods described by this rule can generally be described as allowing each voter one vote but allowing the voter to rank the candidates in order of preference for which candidate that vote (or part of a vote, in the case of STV) will count for in each of a series of rounds of counting votes. This is reflected in the name *Single* Transferrable Vote. Thus there is a key distinction between the ballot's vote that is conditionally counted for a candidate and the marks on a ballot that a voter makes to indicate the voter's rankings. This is a distinction that more common, traditional voting methods do not make. For those other voting methods, there is a one-to-one correspondence between ballot markings and counted votes for a ballot that is validly marked. As a result, traditional election terminology does not make that distinction for the term "vote" used as a noun. However it is an important distinction to respect for the ranked voting methods described by Rule 26. Descriptions that do not make that distinction can mislead voters about how votes are counted. Also, surplus votes, at least initially for a winning candidate, is only a quantity of votes. It is not true that some ballots counting for the winning candidate only provide surplus votes.

Recommend: Change the definition of "Surplus votes" to read:

"Surplus votes" means the number of votes that are counting for a

winning candidate in excess of the winning threshold and that may be transferred to a continuing candidate.

5. In Rule 26.1.8, the definition of "Transfer" should refer to the transfer of a ballot as well as the transfer of its transfer value of a vote. Note that with STV, it is not uncommon for less than one vote to be transferred with a ballot from an eliminated candidate. The definition should encompass such situations. Also, the "next" in "next-highest-ranked continuing candidate" is redundant and subject to ambiguity, since it could be misinterpreted to mean "second-highest-ranked continuing candidate". Removing the hyphen after "next" would help, but removing "next-" would be better. Even better would be to more directly describe the significance of that designation and instead use "most preferred continuing candidate".

Recommend: Change the definition of "Transfer" to read:

"Transfer" means assigning a ballot from an eliminated candidate or a winning candidate to count for the ballot's most preferred continuing candidate, if one exists. For instant runoff contests, the transferred ballot counts as one vote. For single transferable vote contests, the ballots count for a whole vote or a fraction of a vote corresponding to its transfer value.

Similar replacements for "next-highest-ranked continuing candidate" should be applied throughout Rule 26.

6. In Rule 26.1.9, the definition of "Transfer value", the use of four decimal places is not limited to a transfer value counting for a winning candidate. Use of "limited to four decimal places" is ambiguous since a transfer value can be one whole vote. It is preferable to identify the number of decimal places and handling of rounding to the rule where the calculation takes place. See my comment about Rule 26.1.6 about the misuse of "cast". The term is not used for instant runoff contests.

Recommend: Change the definition of "Transfer value" to read:

"Transfer value" means the one whole vote or fraction of a vote that a transferred ballot will contribute to the number of votes for the most-preferred continuing candidate on that ballot in a single transferable vote contest. A ballot initially has a transfer value of one whole vote.

7. In Rule 26.1.10, the definition of "Winning candidate" should also cover candidates that are elected without reaching the threshold in single transferable vote contests. That can happen because the winning threshold in such contests is calculated only at the first round, but some votes will subsequently become exhausted or be lost due to ignoring fractions of vote beyond four decimal places when transferring surplus. This is not a problem with instant runoff contests because the threshold is effectively recalculated each round and no

surplus is transferred. Also the winning threshold and the criterion for its use are described multiple places, sometimes ambiguously, making it difficult to know whether there are differences and if so, which version to apply. It is better here to just refer to the winning threshold and not try to (re-)define it here. For example, the phrase “at least 50 percent plus one vote” does not identify what is the basis for the 50%, i.e. it doesn't answer the question: 50% of what? Nor does it clarify whether 50% of one is one-half or, perversely, zero, or similarly whether 50% of 5 is 2.5 or, equally perversely, just 2.

There is also an issue that the winning threshold is being calculated as being somewhat higher than it has to be. The more traditional winning threshold calculation also makes it more complicated to describe how STV vote counting works with simple numerical examples. A better way is to use the lowest possible threshold and require that the sufficient criterion to be elected is that a candidate must exceed the threshold, not just reach it. Particularly in contests with smaller numbers of voters, this change also increases the amount of surplus that can be transferred. It also allows the effective threshold for STV to more closely resemble the majority criterion for a single-winner election: more than 50%.

Recommend: Use a simpler and lower threshold for STV and use a sufficient condition to be elected of exceed the winning threshold. Change the definition of “Winning candidate” to read:

“Winning candidate” means a candidate who is elected by receiving more votes than the winning threshold or because the number of continuing candidates and other winning candidates is less than or equal to the number of seats to be filled.

8. In Rule 26.1.11, the definition of “Winning threshold”, a simpler, lower threshold should be used. The word “election” in “In any given election” should be “contest”, but it is better to remove that whole extraneous phrase. Define the winning threshold only here and only use the defined term elsewhere rather than restating the definition, possibly in different words and possibly multiplying the possible interpretations.

Recommend: Change the definition of “Winning threshold” to be applicable to both instant runoff voting and to single transferable vote and to read:

“Winning threshold ” means the number of votes to be exceeded that is sufficient for a candidate to be elected. The winning threshold equals the total votes counting for candidates in a round, divided by one more than the number of offices to be filled, rounding up any fraction to four decimal places. $\text{Winning threshold} = (\text{total votes counting for candidates}) / (\text{number of seats to be filled} + 1)$, with any fraction rounded up to four decimal places. For instant runoff contests, the winning threshold is recalculated for each round and

exceeding the threshold is equivalent to having more than 50% of the votes for continuing candidates in the round. For single transferable vote contests, the winning threshold is calculated only for the first round and used unchanged for subsequent rounds.

9. In Rule 26.2, using ranked voting applies to individual contests, not an election as a whole. As a result, "that office" is not a clear reference. Also, is "that office", implying just one, appropriate terminology for multi-winner contests?

Recommend: Use "contest" instead of "election" and instead of "office".

10. In Rule 26.3, there are similar issues as in Rule 26.2 related to using "ranked voting election".

Recommend: Use "ranked voting contest" instead of "ranked voting election".

11. In Rule 26.6, Rule 26.7, and elsewhere, don't succumb to hyper-hyphenating.

Recommend: Follow the style widely used elsewhere and in the C.R.S. and use "instant runoff" instead of "instant-run-off" and use "single transferable vote" instead of "single-transferable-vote". Here and elsewhere, use "contest" instead of "election" when the material is really specific to a contest.

12. In Rule 26.6.2, neither "tabulate" nor "first-choice rank" are defined terms, so it is better to describe what specifically is meant with defined terms. Similarly the defined term "winning candidate" can be used here.

Recommend: Change Rule 26.6.2 to read:

During the first round of tabulation, the designated election official must count the number of votes for each candidate, counting one vote for a candidate for each ballot on which that candidate is the most-preferred continuing candidate.

(a) If there is a winning candidate, no further rounds of tabulation will take place.

(b) If there is not a winning candidate, the designated election official must conduct a second round.

13. In Rule 26.6.3, make similar use of defined terms as for Rule 26.6.2. Also use wording that is more generic and equally applicable to the second round and any subsequent rounds. For example, during the third round, it is not correct to eliminate a candidate based on having the fewest first-choice rankings. In addition, it should be made clear that only ballots counting for the eliminated candidate are transferred.

Recommend: Change Rule 26.6.3 to read:

During each round of tabulation after the first round, the continuing candidate with the fewest votes at the end of the previous round is first eliminated and then each ballot counting for that candidate is transferred to and counted as one additional vote for that ballot's most preferred continuing candidate.

(a) If there is then a winning candidate, the tabulation is complete and no further rounds will take place.

(b) If there is then still not a winning candidate, the designated election official must conduct additional tabulation rounds as described by Rule 26.6.3 until there is a winning candidate.

14. In Rule 26.6.4, dealing with multiple eliminations, a condition must be added so a candidate with fewer votes has to be included in the group of eliminated candidates. Multiple eliminations are not allowed in the first round. For example, if there are candidates with respective vote totals of 50, 30, 10, 8, 5, and 2 votes each, the current language incorrectly allows elimination of the two candidates with 10 and 8 votes without eliminating the two candidates with just 5 and 2 votes each. Eliminating multiple candidates in a round should only be done as a short cut and never in a way that could change who the winners are compared to eliminated just one candidate per round. The current language does not satisfy that requirement.

Recommend: Change Rule 26.6.4 to read:

In any round after the first round, two or more continuing candidates may be simultaneously eliminated in that round and have their ballots transferred if those candidates' combined votes in the prior round are less than the number of votes for the candidate with the next-highest number of votes and if each continuing candidate with fewer votes than a candidate being eliminated is also in the group of candidates being eliminated.

15. Rule 26.6.7 allows and encourages an a generally unacceptable delay in the first tabulation of a second round. This violates basic standards of transparency in election administration which calls for election results, including preliminary results, to be reported to the public as soon as the results are reasonably possible to produce and make available. For jurisdictions with computer-centric vote tabulation and reporting systems, the expectation should be that preliminary, full ranked voting tabulations, not just tabulations restrict to just the first round, are run, updated, and reported as frequently as for other types of contests. These rules should at least come close to reflecting that expectation, allowing only narrowly defined exceptions as is reasonably necessary and explicitly justified.

The following are some common misunderstandings about running multi-round ranked voting tabulations and explanations of why they should not be the basis of election administration policy:

Misunderstanding 1: All ballots have to be available before a second round can be tabulated.

Explanation 1: A ranked voting tabulation can be run on any set of available ballots, just like vote totals for other types of contests can be reported for an

initial subset of ballots. The value of disclosing such preliminary results is the same as for other types of contests. A computer can tabulate a ranked voting contest with hundreds of thousands of ballots and a couple dozen rounds of tabulation in less than a minute. So it typically is feasible to run a full tabulation on available ballots and report results, then when more ballots are available, rerun the tabulation all over again with the additional ballots also included, and to do such repeated tabulations as often as once every 30 minutes.

Misunderstanding 2: A first full tabulation of a ranked voting contest should be delayed until there is reasonable expectation that the elimination order of candidates has stabilized. Voters will be confused by chaotic variations in the elimination order.

Explanation 2: Experience has shown that in practice elimination orders are reasonably stable even with very early election night results reporting. Even if early results did show more variation in elimination order, principles of transparency should take precedence. The public and election administrators will learn from experience how much preliminary results actually fluctuate, typically only about as much as with other kinds of contests. Experience has also shown that voters are more likely to be confused about results if there is a significant and unnecessary delay between when tallies of first ranks are reported and when a follow up preliminary full tabulation is reported.

Misunderstanding 3: Election night is too busy for election officials. They don't have time to run preliminary ranked voting tabulations on election night or not until some days after election day.

Explanation 3: Running ranked voting tabulations should be relatively easy and automated with other results reporting, so that from a human perspective it is no harder than generating preliminary results for other types of contests. A possible exception to this is that reporting round-by-round results of a ranked voting tabulation can take up more space, so that physically printing more pages and making sufficient paper copies for distribution might take a little more time.

Misunderstanding 4: Preliminary full tabulations have to wait until ballots with selections for write-in candidates have been manually adjudicated.

Explanation 4: As is common with other types of contests, it can be appropriate to report unadjudicated selections for write-in candidates as a single, separate line item. In preliminary ranked voting tabulations, this can be handled several ways. One way is to treat that item as any other candidate, subject to the same rules of elimination and winning as other candidates. This approach is useful for polling place reports that report total first-rankings, second-rankings, etc. This also works well for preliminary tabulations in a typical case when write-in candidates receive a minimal number of votes and even as a combined candidate, the write-in candidates are among the first

candidates to be eliminated. However a better way is to treat unadjudicated write-in rankings as a non-candidate report category, one that can accumulate votes, similar to reporting the number of exhausted votes, but not a report category that is subject to elimination and is not capable of being elected. It is also of course possible to not include a ballot in a preliminary full tabulation for a contest if that individual ballot has an unadjudicated write-in selection for that contest.

Note that all California jurisdictions using ranked choice voting report preliminary full tabulations on election night. San Francisco reports full tabulations twice, once with the first batch of results reporting of all contests, typically within an hour after polls close, and again with the last batch of results election night reporting of all contests. This is being done with one of the first voting systems capable of handling ranked voting, a system that was initially designed without consideration for ranked voting more than a decade ago. Newer iterations of voting systems should be expected to be easier for election administrators to use and have more efficient ranked voting tabulation capabilities. Recent voting systems from Dominion claim to have these kinds of improvements.

There are situations where more significant delays in reporting later rounds of a tabulation can be justified. One is if the jurisdiction only manually counts votes. If that is the case for any jurisdiction in Colorado that might use a ranked voting method, it would be appropriate to allow narrow exceptions for that type of situation.

Recommend: At least limit Rule 26.6.7 to specific exceptional situations where it is clearly justified. Otherwise delete the rule or replace it with a rule that encourages preliminary results reporting of full tabulations as frequently as other preliminary results for other contests are reported. An example of such a rule is:

The designated election official must report preliminary election results for all rounds of ranked voting tabulations as frequently as preliminary election results for other contests to the extent that the voting system being used reasonably supports such frequency of reporting results.

16. In Rule 26.7, the tabulation procedures for the single transferable vote method, similar comments, improvements, and corrections that I have identified for instant runoff voting typically apply here as well and I will not repeat them. Other comments that only apply to the single transferable method follow.

Recommend: Extend the recommended improvements and corrections previously identified for instant runoff tabulations to single transferable vote tabulations, as applicable.

17. In Rule 26.7.3, the rule for tabulating a second or subsequent round erroneously allows both elimination of a candidate and distribution of surplus votes from winning candidates and erroneously allows the selection of the candidate to eliminate when there are surplus votes that could be transferred. This can prevent the tabulation from identifying winners who proportionally represent the preferences of voters. Specifically, it violates the fundamental guarantees of proportional representation that single transferable vote is designed to provide. Also, the rule as stated suggests that a winning candidate can have surplus votes transferred repeatedly in multiple rounds.

Also note that Rule 26.7.3 requires that if several candidates have become winning candidates at the start of a round, that all of them should have their surplus votes transferred in that round. This is a good provision. A common but less desirable alternative involves selecting and transferring surplus votes from at most one winning candidate in a round. That involves an unnecessary and rather arbitrary choice that can change who the winner is. It also adds unnecessary decision points that are expected to make risk limiting audits more difficult for single transferable vote contests. For these reasons, such more traditional provisions should be avoided.

It should also be made clear that winning candidates are not newly recognized as such in the middle of transferring ballots from one or more candidates. Such recognition must wait until all transfers for the round are complete. Otherwise it could make a difference in which order ballots from a candidate are transferred.

This rule also needs to identify criteria for whether the tabulation is complete or whether an additional round is complete. Preferably, if just eliminating a candidate turns the remaining continuing candidates into winning candidates, then the transfers from the eliminated candidate do not have to be performed.

Recommend: Change Rule 26.7.3 to read:

A each round of tabulation after the first round is conducted as follows:

(A) If there are any winning candidates with a vote total greater than the winning threshold, the round continues with Rule 26.7.3(B), otherwise it continues with Rule 26.7.3(C).

(B) The surplus votes for those winning candidates with a vote total greater than the winning threshold are transferred as described in Rule 26.7.4. No new winning candidates are recognized until all surplus votes have been transferred. The round then continues at Rule 26.7.3(D).

(C) The continuing candidate with the fewest votes at the end of the previous round is first eliminated. If any new winning candidates can

be recognized, increasing the number of winning candidates to be equal to the number of seats to be filled, the tabulation is complete. Otherwise, each ballot counting for the candidate that was just eliminated is transferred to that ballot's most preferred continuing candidate, adding the ballot's transfer value of a vote to the receiving candidate's number of votes. No new winning candidates are recognized until all ballots have been transferred from the eliminated candidate. The round then continues at Rule 26.7.3(D).

(D) Any new winning candidates are recognized. If the number of winning candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled, the tabulation is complete. Otherwise, the designated election official must conduct an at least one additional tabulation round as described by Rule 26.7.3.

18. In Rule 26.7.4, which specifies details of transferring surplus votes, there is no need to specify the order in which winning candidates have their surplus votes transferred. This is because Rule 26.7.3 requires that surplus votes from all winning candidates be transferred in the round in which those candidates are first recognized as winning candidates, because winning candidates are no longer continuing candidates and so are no longer eligible to receive surplus votes from other winning candidates, and because additional winning candidates are not recognized in the middle of transferring surplus votes. Also, transfers of surplus can not happen in the first round, as currently specified. The explanation of what a winning candidate's number of votes might consist of are unnecessary. The manner of recalculating a transfer value (multiplication) should be explicitly mentioned.

Recommend: Change Rule 26.7.4 by removing any references to choosing the order in which winning candidate surplus votes are transferred and removing any redundant explanation of the kinds of votes might be counting for a winning candidate. Make good use of defined terms. With these changes, Rule 26.7.4 can be simplified to read:

To transfer a winning candidate's surplus votes, the designated election official must calculate the surplus fraction for the winning candidate. Then for each ballot counting for that winning candidate, the ballot's transfer value is recalculated to four decimal places by multiplying the ballot's current transfer value by the surplus fraction and ignoring any remainder. The ballot is then transferred to count for the ballot's most-preferred continuing candidate, adding the ballot's new transfer value to that candidate's number of votes. In any subsequent rounds, the winning candidate has a number of votes that is equal to the winning threshold.

19. No rule identifies what happens when a ballot is supposed to be transferred from a candidate but it does not have a most-preferred continuing candidate.

Recommend: A new rule between 26.8 and 26.9 that reads:

If a ballot is to be transferred from a candidate, but the ballot does not have a most-preferred continuing candidate, that ballot is transferred from the candidate but is not transferred to any other candidate. It does not count for any candidate in any subsequent rounds.

20. In Rule 26.10.1, relating to tabulation audits of ranked voting contests, there is no special provision for a risk-limiting audit of a single-round tabulation if the audit does not confirm the reported winner before escalating to a full manually tally. If the tabulation being audited had revealed the need for additional rounds, a hand count in one percent of the precincts would have been an option. As long as that option exists, reverting to that option should be an allowed possibility in lieu of escalating a risk-limiting audit to a full manual tally of all precincts.

In addition, doing risk-limiting audits that do escalate when necessary to a full manual tally of all precincts should also be an option for contests where the audited tabulation consists of more than one round. While procedures for such risk-limiting audits for ranked voting contests are less developed than for other types of contests, a jurisdiction should have the option of proposing a set of such procedures for a local contest and with approval of those procedures by the Secretary of State, be allowed to use those procedures in addition to or in lieu of the audit of one percent of the precincts. This will encourage the development and practice of risk-limiting audits for these ranked voting methods.

Recommend: Change Rule 26.10.1 to read:

In a coordinated election, if all winning candidates are determined in the first round of tabulation, the county clerk must conduct a risk-limiting audit under Rule 25.2, except that the audit may revert to an audit allowed for a multi-round tabulation in lieu of escalating to a manual tally of all ballots. In all other cases, the county clerk or audit board may conduct a risk-limiting audit using procedures proposed to and approved by the Secretary of State. In those other cases, if such a risk limiting audit is not conducted, the audit board must verify the accuracy of the voting system's tabulation of the ranked voting contest by hand counting the votes in at least one percent of all precincts in which the ranked voting contest appeared on the ballot.

21. In Rule 26.10.4, describing the conduct of a manual count of one percent of the precincts, it should be made clear that relevant reported contest level vote totals and decisions by lot should be used. The alternative is to hand count each precinct or the selected precincts combined as their own complete, isolated contest. However that would generally result the audit manually

checking rankings that were not used for the reported tabulation and not checking some rankings that were used for the reported tabulation, shifting the hand count away from what is the true subject of the audit. The contest level results ensure that the manual count replicates which candidates are eliminated in each round, which candidates are recognized as elected in each round, and the value of the surplus fraction of each winning candidate for whom surplus votes are transferred. Thus, absent any true discrepancies, the manual count should produce round-by-round vote totals that match those in the comprehensive report.

An alternative and useful method for manually auditing a small selection of precincts is to focus on comparing a manual inspection and interpretation of ballot markings to the reported cast vote records, a.k.a. ballot image report, for those precincts and then report both publicly and to the Secretary of State any discrepancies and an amended set of cast vote records for at least those precincts. This ensures that all rankings are manually reviewed and gives greater insight about the impact of any discrepancies. It reflects a procedure that can be slightly extended for performing recounts. It is typically an easier and more effective procedure than hand counting votes, especially for a multi-round single transferable vote contest. I can provide on request procedures for doing this relatively efficiently. They are procedures that were also proposed for use in Maine's recounts of ranked choice voting contests.

Recommend: Add Rules 26.10.4(D) and (E) that read:

(D) When votes are hand counted, the audit must use the reported contest level vote totals being audited and any related decisions by lot to determine during the hand count which candidates are eliminated in each round, which candidates are recognized as winning candidates in each round, the winning threshold, and surplus fractions.

(E) As an alternative to hand counting votes, an audit board may instead compare the ballot-by-ballot rankings determined by human inspection of ballots to the supporting cast vote records, a.k.a. ballot image report, that are being audited and to identify and report any discrepancies.

22. Rule 26 uses the very broad term of "ranked voting method", following the C.R.S. terminology. However both Rule 26 and the C.R.S. actually only refer to a more specific group of ranked voting methods. For example, Rule 26 does not cover the Borda count or various Condorcet methods. In the time since the C.R.S. statutes were adopted, it has become increasingly common to use the term "ranked choice voting" as an umbrella term to refer to methods similar to the single-winner and multi-winner methods described in Rule 26. NIST is close to proposing that term as a glossary-defined term used in that sense for the rules supporting the VVSG 2.0. "Ranked choice voting" is almost certainly the terms

that will be used most popularly to describe these methods. It is unlikely that Colorado would create rules in the foreseeable future for election methods that used a ranked ballot but which did not qualify as ranked choice voting methods. However if Colorado did create rules for such election methods, such rules would almost certainly not fit well in Rule 26. As a result, it would be appropriate to use Rule 26 to at least introduce the "ranked choice voting" term and most preferably to use that term to title Rule 26 and use it where just "ranked voting" or "ranked voting method" is now used in the rule.

Recommend: Change the title of Rule 26 to "Ranked Choice Voting Methods", insert a new Rule 26.1 that correlates that term to the C.R.S. terminology, including specifying that instant runoff voting and single transferable vote are the two subdivisions of ranked choice voting, and otherwise use "ranked choice voting" through out Rule 26 to replace "ranked voting" and "ranked voting method".