



2025 Coordinated Election Risk-limiting Audit Discrepancy Report

The Excel workbook on the Audit Center titled “2025 CE Discrepancy Report” represents the discrepancies reported by audit boards during the 2025 Coordinated Election. It is generated using the Colorado Risk-limiting Audit Software with annotations by the Voting Systems team in the Colorado Department of State. For the original version of the report used, see the report labeled CVR to audit board interpretation comparison on the Audit Center of the Department of State’s website.

This report contains the following columns:

- **county_name** – The county that audited the ballot on which the discrepancy occurred.
- **contest_name** – The contest on the ballot that had the discrepancy.
- **imprinted_id** – This is the unique number assigned to each ballot. In the Democracy Suite voting system, the imprinted_id is a three-part number (XXX-XXX-XXX). The first part represents the tabulator the ballot was tabulated on. The second part represents the batch number of that tabulator. The third part represents the ballot position within the batch.
- **choice_per_voting_computer** – The choice that was tabulated by the voting system according to the cast vote record.
- **audit_board_selection** – The choice that was reported by the audit board.
- **consensus** – Did the two members of the bipartisan audit board agree on how to interpret certain voter markings on the examined ballot.
- **audit_board_comment** – The audit board may provide a comment in the software to explain their selection.
- **audit_reason** – Denotes a targeted race on a ballot by listing the type of audit reason (state or county).
- **Discrepancy Reason** – The Voting Systems team determination on the most probable reason for the discrepancy.

After the audit has concluded, counties are required to send images of each ballot that had a discrepancy (regardless of it being a targeted contest or not). The Voting Systems team at the Department of State then compares the images to reports and uses any information given by the county to try to determine the most likely reason for the discrepancy. In the 2025 Coordinated Election the following reasons were the most likely responsible for all discrepancies:

- Adjudication Error – The bipartisan team of election judges that reviewed the ballot did not accurately adjudicate voter intent during tabulation.
- Ambiguous Voter Intent – The voter marked their ballot in a way that led the audit board and the election judges that initially adjudicated the ballot to differ on their interpretations.
- Audit Board Error – The audit board entered incorrect information which did not accurately replicate the voter markings.
- Voting System Limitation – A narrow circumstance where the voting system tabulates a vote for a selection the voter corrected because the voter did not choose another choice.
- Wrong ballot – The audit board retrieved a different ballot than the ballot required by the RLA software and therefore entered incorrect choices.

The reasons for the discrepancies are an interpretation by the Voting Systems team based on the ballot image as well as some supporting data found in the audit reports or provided by county staff. It is not definitive. Likewise, this list of types of discrepancies is not exhaustive, but are the only types that were found by the Voting Systems team in this election.