C08-0375Decision No. C08-0375
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
07R-327TRDOCKET NO. 07R-327TR
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED RULES regulating transportation by motor vehicle, 4 CODE OF COLORADO REGULATIONS 723-6.
ORDER ON EXCEPTIONS
Mailed Date:	April 11, 2008
Adopted Date:	April 2, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.	BY THE COMMISSION	2
A.	Statement	2
B.	Background	2
C.	Motion	3
D.	Exceptions	4
1.	Notice of Rulemaking	5
2.	Fingerprint-Based Criminal History Checks	7
3.	Democratic National Convention	11
4.	Definition of a Luxury Motor Vehicle	12
a.	Definition of Executive Vans	13
b.	Definition of Executive Cars	14
c.	Ten Year Rule	15
5.	Previously Qualified Vehicles	15
6.	Insurance	16
II.	ORDER	17

I.	BY THE COMMISSION
A.	Statement
1.	This matter comes before the Commission for consideration of exceptions to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 (Recommended Decision), filed by A AAA Bus, Car, Service (A AAA); Tazco, Inc., doing business as Sunshine Taxi (Sunshine Taxi); Alpine Taxi, Inc., (Alpine Taxi); A Company 4 U, doing business as A Limo Company 4 U and/or A Christian Town Car (Christian Town Car); Limousine Association of Colorado (LAOC); and A Ride In Luxury, Inc., (A Ride In Luxury).  This matter also comes before the Commission for consideration of a Joint Reply to exceptions of Christian Town Car, A Ride In Luxury, A AAA, and LAOC and a Joint Motion to Strike Portions of Exceptions of A Ride In Luxury and LAOC (Motion) filed by Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi.  
2.	Now, being fully advised in the matter, we grant exceptions to the Recommended Decision in part, and deny in part.  We grant Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi’s Motion in part, and deny in part, consistent with the discussion below.  
B.	Background
3.	The Commission issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), which commenced this docket, on August 30, 2007.  See Decision No. C07-0742.  The Commission initiated this rulemaking proceeding to implement House Bills 07-1019, 07-1065, and 07-1249, codified at §§ 40-16-101, et seq., and 40-14-101, et seq., C.R.S.  The Commission also sought to modify financial responsibility rules, to clarify the rules for regulated intrastate carriers, and to update civil penalty rules.  In response to the NOPR, written comments were filed by AEX, Inc., doing business as Alpine Express, Inc., Sunshine Taxi, Alpine Taxi, Pioneer Limousine, LLC, Boston Coach, A Custom Coach Boulder Transportation and Centennial Sedans, Destination Services of Colorado, Inc., RMA Worldwide Chauffeured Transportation, Denver Metro Convention & Visitors Bureau, Arrangers, Diva Limousine, Ltd., SuperShuttle International Denver, Inc., Music Express, Inc., and Christian Town Car.  
4.	The hearing in this docket was held on October 15, 2007, before an administrative law judge (ALJ).  Staff of the Commission (Staff), the Colorado Motor Carriers Association, Presidential Limousine, American Coach Limousine, Pioneer Limousine, LAOC, Two Step Limousine, A Custom Coach, Denver Lincoln Limousine, Elite Limousine Service, Colorado Limousine Service, Christian Town Car, Sunshine Taxi, and Alpine Taxi appeared and offered oral comments during the hearing.  The ALJ issued the Recommended Decision, adopting permanent rules, on February 21, 2008. 
C.	Motion 
5.	Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi argue in their Motion that the Commission should strike portions of exceptions filed by A Ride In Luxury and LAOC because they introduce evidence and factual statements not contained in the record.  Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi point out that the letters that A Ride In Luxury attaches to its exceptions were written in March of 2008, after the record in this matter was closed.  Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi also point out that LAOC refers to several letters which are not attached to its exceptions and are not contained in the record.  
6.	A Ride In Luxury makes several factual statements in its exceptions in support of its claim that there is a need for executive vans in the Colorado Springs market.  The record does not contain any references to this matter.  LAOC, in paragraphs 4A and 4E of its exceptions, refers to foreign visitors and mountain driving conditions in support of its argument that vans should be included in luxury limousine fleets.  The record does not contain any references to either matter.  In paragraphs 4B, 4C, and 4D, LAOC refers to the Democratic National Convention, music bands, and business executives, also in support of the same argument.  The transcript does contain references with respect to these issues.  
7.	We must base our rulemaking decisions on the evidence introduced at evidence-gathering stage of the process.  See Home Builders Ass’n v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 720 P.2d 552, 559-560 (Colo. 1986).  We note that LAOC and A Ride In Luxury, although pro se, appear frequently before the Commission.  It is also well settled that pro se litigants are bound by the same procedural rules as attorneys.  See Yadon v. Southward, 64 P.3d 909 (Colo. App. 2002); Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910 (Colo. 2002); Negron v. Golder, 2004 WL 2744605 (Colo. App. 2004).  We agree with Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi’s Motion with respect to A Ride In Luxury’s exceptions and strike the references to the alleged need for executive vans in the Colorado Springs market and the letters attached to the exceptions.  We also agree with Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi’s Motion with respect to LAOC’s exceptions, in part, and strike paragraphs 4A and 4E, and the references to several letters in paragraph 4C.  
D.	Exceptions
8.	A AAA states in its pleading that it “challenges and opposes” the Recommended Decision.  A Ride In Luxury refers to its pleading as an “Answer to Recommended Decision.” Christian Town Car refers to its pleading as an “Answer to Recommended Decision” and requests that the Commission conduct a Rehearing, Reargument and Reconsideration (RRR) in this matter.  Pursuant to § 40-6-114, C.R.S., RRR is not available as a remedy until a Commission decision is issued, which has not yet occurred, when the above parties submitted pleadings in response to the Recommended Decision.  We therefore construe the pleadings submitted by these pro se parties as exceptions rather than requests for RRR.
1.	Notice of Rulemaking
9.	Christian Town Car and A AAA claim that the Commission did not provide adequate notice of the hearing held on October 15, 2007 to the limousine industry, which will be directly affected by this rulemaking proceeding.  Christian Town Car states that the mailing list maintained by the Commission is inadequate because a subscriber to that list receives a notice of every Commission decision and it is difficult to search for the one that he or she needs.  Christian Town Car requests that we notify all limousine companies based in Colorado in writing of the exceptions in this docket.  A AAA states that “no real substantive notice was given to the entire limo industry of Colorado for the very major, sweeping changes in existing rules” and that it does not have “time or staff to watch the PUC site day after day.”  
10.	Section 24-4-103, C.R.S., governs rulemaking by Colorado administrative agencies, such as this Commission.  It is designed to ensure that the public will have an adequate notice of, and the chance to comment on, proposed rules before they become effective.  The agencies must adhere to the following steps to notify the public before a rulemaking hearing may be held:  
	a.	The agency must file a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) with the Secretary of State.  See §§ 24-4-103(3)(a) and 24-4-103(4)(a), C.R.S.  The NOPR must include the following:
	i.	the time, place, and nature of the rulemaking hearing;
	ii.	the authority under which the rules are proposed;
	iii.	either the terms or substance of the proposed rules, or a description of the subjects and issues involved;
	iv.	if any material is to be incorporated by reference, it must be clearly identified;
	v.	a statement that the proposed rules will be available for inspection by any person at the agency’s office no later than five days prior to the scheduled hearing.  
	vi.	a statement that interested persons have a right to submit written data, views, or argument, and to make an oral presentation.  
	b.	The NOPR must be filed with the DORA Executive Director.  See § 24-4-103(2.5)(a), C.R.S.
	c.	On the 10th day of the month after the NOPR is submitted to the Secretary of State, it shall be published in The Colorado Register.  
	d.	The NOPR must be sent to all persons who are on the mailing list kept by the agency no later than the date it is published in The Colorado Register.  See § 24-4-103(3)(b), C.R.S. The persons who request to be on the mailing list must pay a fee to the agency to cover the actual cost of copying and mailing the proposed rules to them.  Id.  
	e.	The rulemaking hearing must be held twenty days or more after the NOPR is published.  See § 24-4-103(3)(a), C.R.S.  
11.	The rules promulgated by an administrative agency are presumed valid.  The burden is on the challenger to demonstrate that they are in excess of the statutory authority or otherwise invalid.  Studor, Inc. v. Examining Bd. of Plumbers, 929 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1996).
12.	We deny the relief sought by Christian Town Car and A AAA on this issue.  We find that all rulemaking notification requirements contained in Title 24 have been met in this docket.  The NOPR was submitted to the Secretary of State on August 31, 2007, and it was published in the September 7, 2007 edition of The Colorado Register.  The NOPR contained all of the information required in § 24-4-103(3)(a), C.R.S.  It listed the time, place, and the nature of the rulemaking hearing; the authority under which the rules were proposed; the proposed rules themselves and a description of the subjects and issues involved; and a statement that interested persons had a right to submit written data, views, or argument, and to make an oral presentation.  See Decision No. C07-0742.  In addition, the hearing in this matter was held more than twenty days after the NOPR was published, as required by § 24-4-103(3)(a), C.R.S.  Finally, we note that the proposed rules are rather broad and would affect, to some extent, all Colorado transportation carriers.  It would have been prohibitively expensive to mail the NOPR to approximately 8,900 carriers who have not paid the fee pursuant to § 24-4-103(3)(b), C.R.S.  
2.	Fingerprint-Based Criminal History Checks 
13.	The ALJ addressed concerns expressed by several parties at the hearing related to subsection (3) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S.  See Recommended Decision, at ¶31.  These statutes require drivers of taxis and exempt vehicles to submit a set of their fingerprints to the Commission.  The Commission, in turn, must forward the fingerprints to the Colorado Bureau of Investigations (CBI) to obtain a fingerprint-based criminal history record check.  Subsections (3) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., state that: 
	(3)	An individual whose fingerprints are checked … may, pending the results of the criminal history record check, drive…in connection with his or her employment …for up to sixty days after the commission forwards the fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation or until the commission receives the results of the check, whichever occurs first.  Upon the commission’s receipt of the results, the individual may resume driving … so long as the driving does not violate applicable law and does not occur while the individual has a criminal conviction on his or her record that disqualifies and prohibits him or her from driving….
The parties expressed concern that the CBI may be unable, in some instances, to process these background checks within 60 days, and the individuals would be required to stop driving until the results are received.  This may cause financial concerns for the drivers and staffing concerns for the carriers, possibly penalizing them for actions of the CBI or the Commission.  
14.	The ALJ ruled that subsections (3) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., were clear and unambiguous and required that individuals stop driving upon the expiration of the sixty day period if the results of the background check were still pending.  The ALJ stated that the word “resume” in the statutes indicated that the legislature contemplated the possibility that an individual may have to stop driving if the results of his or her background check are not received within 60 days for any reason.  The ALJ stated that the Commission did not have the authority to adopt a rule that would ignore a part of the statutes.  
15.	Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi disagree and argue in their exceptions that a “safe harbor rule,” which would allow the individuals to drive pending results of the background check regardless of its length, should be adopted.  They claim that the ALJ interpreted subsections (3) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S. too narrowly.  Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi argue that the legislative intent was to allow persons to continue to drive while their fingerprint results were pending; otherwise this interim driving would have been prohibited entirely.  Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi argue that the “up to sixty days…” language must yield to this legislative intent.  They claim that the word “resume” in the statutes refers to drivers who choose not to drive at all during this interim period.   
16.	We agree with the ALJ’s interpretation of subsections (3) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., and therefore deny the exceptions filed by Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi on this issue.  It is true that some individuals with no criminal history may be precluded from driving if their background checks take longer than sixty days for any reason.  However, in construing a statute, we must look first at the plain language of the statute.  Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1997).  We may not resort to the rules of statutory construction and must apply a statute as written if its plain language is clear and unambiguous.  Id.  We are not to presume that the legislature used any language in a statute idly and without intent that the language be given meaning.  Blue River Defense Comm’n v. Town of Siverthorne, 516 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1973).  We agree with the ALJ that subsections (3) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., are clear and unambiguous and therefore we do not have the authority to adopt a safe harbor rule advocated by Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi.  We find that any solution to the apparent inequity resulting from the above statutes must be addressed legislatively.  
17.	Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi also argue that §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., do not allow the Commission to impose duties and sanctions on the carriers as far as compliance with and monitoring the background checks for their drivers.  The ALJ pointed out that subsections (5) of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., state that:  
	(5)	The commission shall, consistent with the requirements of this section, promulgate rules concerning the employment of, contracting with, and retention of an individual whose criminal history record is checked pursuant to this section.
The ALJ found that the above language provides sufficient statutory authority for requiring the carriers to ensure that their drivers comply with the criminal background check requirements.  We agree.  We find that, if the Commission were to impose no duties and sanctions on transportation carriers, the enforcement of §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., would be severely limited and the legislative intent would be frustrated.  
18.	Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi also argue that a rule should be adopted that requires the Commission to notify the carriers of the results of the background checks if it knows the identity of the carriers.  We disagree.  Sections 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S. require prospective drivers to submit a set of their fingerprints to the Commission.  This submission itself does not indicate the identity of the related transportation carrier.  The Commission only knows who the carrier is, if at all, when the carrier submits a payment on behalf of the prospective driver.  When prospective drivers themselves submit a payment, the Commission has no way of knowing who the related transportation carrier is.  
19.	Moreover, driver turnover from carrier to carrier is not infrequent and some drivers work for and contract with multiple transportation carriers at the same time.  By the time the fingerprint submission is processed, the driver may no longer be working for the same carrier.  The Commission has no way to track the resulting turnover and cannot, with certainty, notify the correct carrier.  Finally, we see no reason why a carrier cannot require its drivers to present evidence of their qualification status, just as they are required to present their driver license.  
20.	Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi request in their exceptions that the recommended rules on criminal history checks be clarified with respect to immigrant drivers who have not been in this country for the time periods listed in §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., and whose foreign criminal history is not available through the CBI.  We note that §§ 40-10-105.5 and 40-16-104.5, C.R.S., specifically refer to crimes committed “in this state” or “in any other state or in the United States.” This language is clear that only crimes committed in this country are available through the CBI and that drivers whose record checks do not reveal the crimes that they have committed (because the crimes have been committed in another country or while the driver was a juvenile, for example) are not precluded from driving.  We believe that the recommended rules are sufficiently clear on this issue and therefore decline to amend them. 
21.	Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi finally request that we clarify whether individuals who take a leave of absence, then return to driving, would need to resubmit to a background check.  Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi argue that such persons should not have to resubmit to background checks because recommended Rule 6015(c)(II) provides that the qualification notice is good for two years.  
22.	Recommended Rule 6015(c)(II) states that “[a] driver shall resubmit to the Commission a set of the driver’s fingerprints and payment of the actual cost to conduct a record check within two years after the Commission provides him/her with the qualification notice….”  We agree that the interpretation offered by Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi is correct and that individuals who take a leave of absence, then return to the driving profession within two years would not need to resubmit to a background check.  We believe that recommended Rule 6015(c)(II) is sufficiently clear on this point and find that no further amendment on this point is necessary.  
3.	Democratic National Convention
23.	A AAA argues in its exceptions that small, Colorado-based limousine companies will be negatively affected by the issuance of temporary permits to out-of-state carriers during the Democratic National Convention (DNC).  A AAA claims that there is no proof that local companies are not able to handle the demand generated by the DNC.  We note that we recently commenced an investigatory docket to address the demand generated by the DNC, Docket No. 08I-053C, and that A AAA and other carriers have submitted comments in that docket.  We find that all concerns related to the DNC will be better addressed in Docket No. 08I-053C rather than here.  The purpose of permanent rules being promulgated here is to describe the manner in which statewide motor vehicle operations will be regulated in the long term, not to address a one-time event in the Denver area.  
4.	Definition of a Luxury Motor Vehicle 
24.	LAOC and A Ride In Luxury, among other parties argue in their exceptions that the Commission should not attempt to define a luxury motor vehicle in the recommended rules, or, in the alternative, adopt a flexible definition such as “a vehicle commonly used in luxury limousine fleets.”  LAOC states that there are two periodicals commonly read by persons the limousine industry, The Limousine Digest and Limousine & Chauffeured Transportation, and suggests that the Commission refer to these periodicals in defining a luxury motor vehicle.  In response to exceptions, Sunshine Taxi and Alpine Taxi argue that the ALJ was correct in rejecting suggestions that the recommended rules emphasize the luxurious nature of the services provided as opposed to luxurious nature of the vehicles used.  
25.	The ALJ pointed out that § 40-16-101(3), C.R.S., states that a “luxury limousine” is a “chauffeur-driven, luxury motor vehicle as defined by the commission.”  See Recommended Decision, at ¶51, emphasis added.  The ALJ found that the Commission could not ignore this statutory requirement and therefore recommended rules should define a luxury motor vehicle and not just a luxury service.  
26.	We agree with the ALJ, Sunshine Taxi, and Alpine Taxi that we may not ignore § 40-16-101(3), C.R.S., which defines a luxury limousine in terms of a luxury motor vehicle and not just in terms of a luxury service.  In addition, we find that a definition such as “a vehicle commonly used in luxury limousine fleets” offered by LAOC is too vague.  A statute (or a rule promulgated by an administrative agency) is void for vagueness if it does not give a fair warning of the conduct prohibited or if its standards are so ill-defined as to create a danger of arbitrary and capricious enforcement.  See Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930, 943-944 (Colo. 1985).  The test is whether persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily disagree as to its meaning and differ as to its application.  Id.  In addition, the Commission may not delegate its ultimate decision making authority to a third party.  See Baca Grande Corp. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 544 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1976). We find that the approaches offered by LAOC may result in a statutory violation, a rule that is void for vagueness, or an impermissible delegation of the Commission authority to the publishers of The Limousine Digest or Limousine & Chauffeured Transportation.  We therefore deny the exceptions on this issue.  
a.	Definition of Executive Vans
27.	LAOC and other parties argue in their exceptions that the definition of “executive vans” in recommended Rule 6308(a)(III) should include fifteen passenger vans with standard bench seats.  These vans were classified as luxury limousines in Senate Bill 98-200.  The comments submitted by Destination Services of Colorado, Arrangers, Denver Metro Convention & Visitors Bureau, and other parties express the need for the fifteen passenger vans to remain a part of Colorado limousine fleets.  These parties claim that their customers frequently request unmarked, upscale fifteen passenger vans, especially customers consisting of large groups or groups with a large amount of luggage and equipment.  These parties further argue that, since the passage of Senate Bill 98-200, fifteen passenger vans with seats that can be easily removed and installed became a standard in the luxury limousine industry when transporting large groups. 
28.	We agree that the definition of “executive vans” in recommended Rule 6308(a)(III) should be amended to include vans that have had their interior enhanced by (1) the installation of captain’s chairs, couch seats, or similar seating; or (2) the installation of television and beverage service.  This modification will also ensure that Rule 6308(a)(III) complies with § 40-16-101(3), C.R.S., by adequately distinguishing the executive van as a luxury motor vehicle.  We therefore grant LAOC’s exceptions in part and redraft the rule as follows  (attached as Appendix A): 
	(III)	Executive van, which is a motor vehicle built on a cutaway chassis, a motor coach, or a van (but not a mini van as classified by the manufacturer) whose interior has been enhanced by the installation of either:
	(A)	captain’s chairs, couch seats, or similar seating in place of standard bench seating; or
	(B)	both of the following:
	(i)	An electronic video media system such as television, DVD, or VHS that is securely attached to the motor vehicle in a professional manner.  The screen shall have a diagonal measurement of at least three inches, be viewable by passengers seated to the rear of the driver, and be in compliance with 49 C.F.R., § 393.88.
	(ii)	Beverages and beverage service amenities, including at least an ice container and glasses or cups.  The beverages and amenities shall be securely positioned inside a console or cabinet located inside the passenger compartment, to include any containment system, console and cup holder built into the motor vehicle by the manufacturer, and securely attached to the motor vehicle in a professional manner.  The beverages are not required to be alcoholic in nature.  
b.	Definition of Executive Cars
29.	LAOC and Christian Town Car argue against recommended Rule 6308(a)(II),  which lists specific vehicle models that qualify as executive cars.  LAOC and Christian Town Car state that car manufacturers change models over time and that the list is too restrictive as these changes occur.  
30.	We agree that recommended Rule 6308(a)(II) should be amended to expand the list of luxury sedans and luxury sport utility vehicles.  Although there is no way to guarantee the list includes all luxury sedans and luxury sport utility vehicles, the Commission can review the list regularly and make changes through its rulemaking process.  We therefore grant exceptions filed by LAOC and Christian Town Car, in part, and redraft the rule as follows (attached as Appendix A):
	(II)	Executive car, which is a motor vehicle that has four doors and is:
	(A)	a sedan including Acura RL, Audi A8 Series, Audi A6 Series, Audi S8 Series, Bentley Continental Flying Spur, Bentley Arnage, BMW 7 Series, BMW 5 Series, BMW Alpina, BMW M5, Cadillac DTS, Chrysler 300, Ferrari 612, Infiniti M Series, Jaguar S-Type, Jaguar Vdp Lwb, Jaguar XJ Series, Jaguar X-Type Series, Jaguar Super, Lexus LS Series, Lexus G Series, Lexus E Series, Lincoln Town Car, Maserati Quattroporte, Maybach 57 Series, Maybach 62 Series, Mercedes-Benz S Class Series. Mercedes-Benz E Class Series, or Rolls Royce Phantom; or
	(B)	a sport utility vehicle including Audi Q7, Cadillac Escalade, Chevrolet Suburban, Ford Excursion, Ford Expedition, GMC Yukon, Hummer (all models, excluding sport utility truck version), Infiniti QX, Lexus LX, Lincoln Navigator, Mercedes-Benz M Class Series, Mercedes-Benz G Class Series, or Mercury Mariner Hybrid with livery package.
c.	Ten Year Rule
31.	Christian Town Car, A AAA, and LAOC argue against recommended Rule 6305(b), which provides that, in general, luxury limousine carriers shall not use vehicles older than ten years in their fleets.  This rule mirrors Rule 6254(c) for taxicabs and is intended to ensure that the quality of limousine fleets is maintained at a high level.  We find that recommended Rule 6305(b) should remain and deny exceptions filed by Christian Town Car, A AAA, and LAOC on this issue. 
32.	We further note that the waiver process remains available to a luxury limousine carrier wishing to obtain Commission approval to operate a vehicle that does not meet the restrictions in Rule 6305 or the categories in Rule 6308.  
5.	Previously Qualified Vehicles
33.	In its exceptions, Christian Town Car requests a clarification of recommended Rule 6309 with respect to whether a vehicle would lose its luxury limousine qualification if a carrier removes it from service for a period of time during a slow season then brings it back into service.  Christian Town Car also inquires whether a vehicle would lose its qualification when a transportation carrier’s exempt passenger carrier registration is cancelled and is later reactivated.   Recommended Rule 6309 states that “…all vehicles registered as luxury limousines on or before the effective date of these rule shall maintain their registration status so long as the luxury limousine permit under which they were originally registered remains continuously active and is not revoked.”
34.	We agree with Christian Town Car that recommended Rule 6309 must be clarified.  We therefore grant Christian Town Car’s exceptions and redraft the rule as follows (attached as Appendix A): 
	Notwithstanding anything in Rules 6305(b) and 6308 to the contrary, any vehicle qualified as a luxury limousine on or before the effective date of this rule, and that is operated under the exempt passenger carrier registration under which it was so qualified, shall maintain its qualification status.  
We also amend the title of recommended Rule 6309 to read “Luxury Limousines– Previously Qualified Vehicles” for purposes of consistency and to avoid confusion with Rule 6001(o).  
6.	Insurance
35.	Christian Town Car argues in its exceptions that recommended Rule 6007(g) should not be adopted.  Recommended Rule 6007(g) states that:
	The transportation carrier’s failure to file proof of liability coverage, as required by this rule, shall constitute a rebuttable presumption that the carrier is not properly covered under the insurance requirements of this rule.  
Christian Town Car argues that recommended Rule 6007(g) would make a transportation carrier liable if its insurance company fails to send a proof of insurance to the Commission by mistake.  
36.	Transportation carriers, in general, are required to obtain and keep in force at all times a proper motor vehicle insurance coverage or surety bond coverage.  See Rule 6007(a)(I).  The ALJ found that recommended Rule 6007(g) was necessary in light of the difficulty in proving lack of insurance when a respondent carrier does not appear in Commission proceedings and Staff is unable to cross-examine on that point.  See Recommended Decision, at ¶¶14-15.  The ALJ found it was possible that a transportation carrier may be cited for lack of insurance because its insurance company fails to send the necessary paperwork to the Commission.  However, the presumption established in recommended Rule 6007(g) could be easily rebutted by showing that the carrier, in fact, has the necessary insurance coverage at all times.  Id.  
37.	We note that the rules requiring transportation carriers to maintain an appropriate insurance or a surety bond were promulgated to protect the public.  See Decision No. C07-1000, issued on November 27, 2007 in Docket No. 06G-0651CP.  We agree with the ALJ and find that recommended Rule 6007(g) is necessary to enforce this important public protection.  The presumption established in recommended Rule 6007(g) is easily rebuttable if a transportation carrier indeed has an appropriate insurance policy.  We therefore deny exceptions filed by Christian Town Car on this issue and adopt recommended Rule 6007(g).
II.	ORDER
A.	The Commission Orders That:
1.	The exceptions of A Company 4 U, doing business as A Limo Company 4 U and/or A Christian Town Car, to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 are granted, in part, and denied, in part, consistent with the discussion above. 
2.	The exceptions of Limousine Association of Colorado to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 are granted, in part, and denied, in part, consistent with the discussion above. 
3.	The exceptions of A Ride In Luxury to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 are granted, in part, and denied, consistent with the discussion above. 
4.	The exceptions of Tazco, Inc., doing business as Sunshine Taxi, to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 are denied, consistent with the discussion above. 
5.	The exceptions of Alpine Taxi, Inc., to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 are denied, consistent with the discussion above.  
6.	The exceptions of A AAA Bus, Car, Service to Recommended Decision No. R08-0169 are denied, consistent with the discussion above. 
7.	The Motion to Strike Portions of Exceptions of A Ride In Luxury and Limousine Association of Colorado, jointly filed by Tazco, Inc., doing business as Sunshine Taxi, and Alpine Taxi, Inc., is granted, in part, and denied, in part, consistent with the discussion above.
8.	The 20 day time period provided by § 40-6-114, C.R.S., to file an application for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration shall begin on the first day after the effective date of this Order.
9.	This Order is effective upon its Mailed Date.
B.	ADOPTED IN COMMISSIONERS’ WEEKLY MEETING
April 2, 2008
		THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

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	Commissioners
	
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